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NOTES
In the light of the strict tests laid down by the Missouri appel-
late decisions with regard to grounds justifying the appointment
of a receiver, it is interesting to note that in the statistical report
featured in this issue of the REVIEW, 17 it is pointed out that out of
603 applications for receivership during the eight years from
1925 to 1932, 330 of the cases resulted in appointments, and in
only 31 out of the remaining 273 did the court formally deny the
appointment after a hearing. This generosity in appointment
would seem to indicate that the Circut Courts of St. Louis seem
hardly to have applied the strict tests of the appellate decisions
considered in this note.
The percentage of receivership cases which have been taken
on appeal to the higher courts of Missouri is very low. It is, how-
ever, probably not unreasonable to assume that this dearth of
appeals has been due not to the fact that the circuit judge has not
exceeded his discretion, but rather to the fact that once the re-
ceiver has been appointed the damage to the defendant has been
done, and to appeal the case would be practically futile.
JOHN E. CURBY, '34.
THE INTEREST REQUIRED OF A PETITIONER FOR
RECEIVERSHIP IN MISSOURI
The two student notes included in this receivership issue of the
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW are intended to supplement the statistical
report upon receiverships in the Circuit Courts of St. Louis, which
is the feature article of the issue.1 The note preceding this one
considered the grounds for receivership in Missouri, in other
words the factual set-ups in which the courts have deemed it
necessary and proper that this drastic equitable remedy be ap-
plied. This note contemplates a consideration of the interest
which a petitioner for receivership must show to give himself
standing in court. The former note was an effort to answer the
169 Mo. 177, 69 S. W. 4; Ashton v. Penfield (1911) 233 Mo. 391, 135 S. W.
938; Price v. Banker's Trust Co. (Mo. 1915) 178 S. W. 745; Sedberry v.
Gwynn (1920) 282 Mo. 632, 222 S. W. 629; State ex rel. Caron v. Dearing
(1921) 291 Mo. 169, 236 S. W. 629; Ward v. National Ice Cream Co. (Mo.
1922) 246 S. W. 554; Bushman v. Bushman (1925) 311 Mo. 551, 279 S. W.
122; Ingram v. Clover Leaf Lumber Co. (Mo. 1932) 55 S. W. (2d) 295; State
ex rel. Lund and Sager v. Mulloy (1932) 330 Mo. 333, 49 S. W. (2d) 1;
Laumier v. Sun-Ray Products Co. (1932) 330 Mo. 542, 50 S. W. (2d) 640;
Blades v. Billings Mfg. Co. (1915) 187 Mo. App. 597, 174 S. W. 177; State
ex rel. Priest v. Calhoun (1920) 207 Mo. App. 149, 226 S. W. 329.
17 Treiman, An Analysis of the Statistical Data on Receivership Suits Filed
in the St. Louis Circuit Court 1925-1932 Inclusive (1934) 19 ST. Louis
L. REV. 87.
1 19 ST. Louis L. REv. 87.
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question: Under what circumstances will the courts of Missouri
apply the remedy of receivership? Here the problem under con-
sideration is: Who may come into court and set out that his inter-
est justifies him in asserting facts suitable to authorize the ap-
pointment of a receiver?
Generally speaking, according to the written decisions, it is not
everyone with a beneficial interest or a legal right who may come
into equity to pray the appointment of a receiver. The law of
Missouri requires, as does the law of other states, a particular
degree of petitioner's interest. In the case of Merriam v. St. Louis,
Cape Girardeau, & Fort Worth Railway Company,2 decided in
1896, the Supreme Court of Missouri laid down the following gen-
eral proposition, from which subsequent decisions have not de-
parted:
"It is fundamental that to authorize a receiver, the plaintiff
must show that he has a right to the property itself, or that he
has some lien upon it, or that it constitutes a special fund to
which he has a right to resort to to the satisfaction of his
claim." 3
As a general statement of the law, the Merriam case declares the
* generally accepted rule in all jurisdictions, 4 in the absence of
special state statute altering the interest requirements. 5 The ap-
plication of the general proposition will be considered with
especial reference to the interest, as petitioners for receivership,
of (1) stockholders of a corporation; and (2) general unsecured
contract creditors.
1. STOCKHOLDERS AS PETITIONERS FOR RECEIVERSHIP
By the great weight of authority, although a court of equity has
no jurisdiction, in the absence of statute, to dissolve a corpora-
tion, or to wind it up, when such liquiudation is the sole or princi-
pal relief sought,6 it has the inherent power, in a proper case, to
place the company in receivership, even in the absence of its in-
solvency, if the fraud or gross mismanagement of the officers or
2136 Mo. 145, 36 S. W. 630.
3 L. c. 136 Mo. 163, 36 S. W. 634.
4 See cases cited from various jurisdictions in 54 C. J. 27.
1 See, for example, application of the Alabama statute in People's Auto
Co. v. Manufacturers' Finance Acceptance Corporation (Ala. 1933) 146
So. 145.
6 "The authorities unanimously hold that a court of equity, unless so em-
powered by statute, is without jurisdiction to appoint a receiver to wind up
the affairs of a corporation and dissolve it." Laumeier v. Sun-Ray Products
Co. (1932) 330 Mo. 542, 50 S. W. (2d) 640. There is no Missouri statute au-
thorizing dissolution of a corporation by appointment of a receiver. See
also: State ex rel. Donnell v. Foster (1910) 225 Mo. 171, 125 S. W. 184;
State ex rel. Kopke v. Mulloy (1931) 329 Mo. 1, 43 S. W. (2d) 806.
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directors imminently threatens to endanger the interest of the
petitioner in the business or assets.7
The right to petition for the appointment of a receiver for a
corporation in a proper case exists in a stockholder of the com-
pany,8 provided that he comes into court with clean hands.9 Such
appointment, however, will not be granted unless imperative for
the preservation of the property of the corporation and for the
protection of the minority stockholders or stockholder; as courts
only as a last resort will take control of a corporation away from
those in whose hands the corporation agreements and the law have
placed it.1o Generally speaking, it must be clear that those in
control of the affairs of the company, by such conduct as can be
deemed fraudulent, ultra vires, or in breach of trust, are endan-
gering the investment value of the shareholder's interest, and that
the stockholder has no remedy within the corporation. 1
Assuming the existence of a corporate condition justifying, as
a matter of substantive corporation law, the transfer of the prop-
erty and business of a corporation from its officers, directors or
majority stockholders to an officer of the court, there is one great
limitation upon the right of a stockholder, as petitioner, to in-
voke the jurisdiction of equity in such proper case. This limita-
tion is based upon the obvious requirement that the petitioner
must have a beneficial interest to be enforced and protected. Con-
sequently, where the petitioner alleges that the business for
which he prays a receivership is insolvent, in the sense that it
is so largely indebted that it cannot possibly be operated at a
profit and cannot be liquidated so as to cover even all of the out-
standing claims of creditors, the right of the petitioner to assert
the otherwise proper prayer for relief is susceptible to challenge
on the basis that he is asserting no real or substantial interest de-
manding protection.
T 16 Fletcher, Cyc. Corp. (1933) Chapter 64.
a State ex rel. Kopke v. Mulloy, note 6 above. Cf. Dickerson v. Cass
County Bank (1895) 95 Iowa 392, 64 N. W. 395; Goodwin v. Milwaukee
Lithographing Co. (1920) 171 Wis. 352, 177 N. W. 618. 14A C. J. 948.
9 See Franklin National Bank v. Kennerly Coal & Coke Co. (1930) 300
Pa. 479, 150 Atl. 902.
-0 Shafer v. Home Trading Co. (Mo. App. 1932) 52 S. W. (2d) 462: "This
(the general Missouri receivership statute, R. S. Mo. 1929, sec. 4960) is a
drastic statute which should be invoked only when all other remedies fail."
State ex rel. v. McQuillan (1914) 260 Mo. 164, 168 S. W. 924.
11 "A receiver should never be appointed unless it appears that the plain-
tiff has attempted and exhausted all remedies within the corporation itself."
State ex rel. v. McQuillan, note 10 above. 16 Fletcher Cyc. Corp. (1933)
sec. 7689: "As a general rule to entitle a minority of the stockholders to a
receiver over the corporation it must appear that the complaining stock-
holders have made all reasonable efforts to procure the directors or other
stockholders to redress their grievances, unless such effort clearly would be
unavailing."
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The leading Missouri case upon this point is State ex rel. Kopke
V. Mulloy,12 decided in 1931, which established in Missouri law the
rule that a stockholder, as such, is not entitled to have a receiver
appointed to administer property, the proceeds of which must
necessarily go to creditors.' 3 In the Kopke case the petitioner,
holder of 30 out of 98,500 shares in a corporation, asserted that
the corporation business, because of changed economic conditions,
could no longer possibly be operated at a profit, and that the debts
of the company were greatly in excess of its assets. The Supreme
Court of Missouri directed a writ of prohibition to the St. Louis
County circuit judge who had granted the receivership, ex parte,
and against the receiver appointed, enjoining them from further
action in the case, holding that the petitioner had "stated herself
out of court."
"If all of these conditions exist, what possible benefit can ac-
crue to this stockholder in a receivership? If the company is
hopelessly insolvent and its assets cannot possibly pay its
debts, and its business cannot under any circumstances be
carried on at a profit because of the law of supply and de-
mand, then the only thing that can be done is what should
have been done earlier, to-wit, to close out the business, con-
vert its assets into money, and pay its debts as far as possible.
In this only the creditors are interested."
The reasoning of the Kopke case seems unassailable. The stock-
holder's interest in seeing that the company's property and af-
fairs were placed in the hands of the receiver was purely technical.
She is not liable for the debts of the company, and, under the finan-
cial circumstances indicated in her own allegations, she can hope
to recover nothing from her investment.
It may be stated as an established proposition in Missouri law,
therefore, that a stockholder has standing in equity to petition
for the appointment of a receiver for a corporation in which he
is interested, only when the financial condition of the company is
such that he and the other stockholders may reasonably expect
to salvage something from the wreck, after the debts of the cor-
poration are paid. If the financial circumstances are such that
the efforts of a receiver could not possibly put the company back
on a paying basis, and even liquidation of the company would not
yield any benefit to the holders of its stock, the stockholder, even
where the grounds for receivership otherwise would be adequate,
12 Note 6, above.
23 Accord: Wild v. Adams, Evans & Co. (N. Y. 1927) 199 App. Div. 401,




cannot come into equity to assert a right which properly belongs
to the creditors, and should be exercised by them.14
II. GENERAL UNSECURED CREDITORS AS PETITIONERS FOR RECEIV-
ERSHIP
A. Where the Defendant Corporation Resists the Appointment
In considering the nature of the interest which the creditor
suing to have a receiver placed over the assets of his debtor must
show, the consideration may begin with a statement of the recog-
nized general principle that in the absence of statute especially
authorizing such action, a creditor having no judgment or lien
upon the company's property cannot obtain the appointment of a
receiver, without regard to whether the corporation is solvent or
insolvent.15 As otherwise expressed in a statement frequently
cited by the courts:
"A general or simple creditor who has not reduced his claim
to judgment, and who has no right or interest in or lien upon
the property of the debtor, and whose interest or position
does not differ from that of any other ordinary creditor, has
no standing to obtain the appointment of a receiver of such
property." 16
Consequently, in the absence of statute, and in the absence of
waiver by the defendant of his objection to the interest of the
petitioner (in those jurisdictions where appearance and consent
are deemed a waiver), it is necessary for the simple contract
creditor, before coming into equity to seek a receivership to col-
lect his claim, to establish his judgment at law, and have the exe-
cution made upon it returned nulla bona.17 Then the prayer for
receivership may be made ancillary to a proper creditor's bill to
obtain satisfaction of the plaintiff's claim by resorting to assets
attainable only through the interposition of equity.' 8 There are,
under unusual circumstances, exceptions to this general require-
ment that a general claim first be established at law, in cases
14 With reference to the requirement of interest demanded of a stock-
holder-petitioner by the decision in the Kopke case, it is significant to note
that in 106 of the 330 cases considered in the statistical report featured in
this issue, the suit for receivership was by one who described himself solely
as a stockholder. In 35 of these cases, the stockholder in his petition that
the company was insolvent.
15 16 Fletcher, Cyc. Corp. (1933) sec. 7692, page 96. Clark, Receivers
(2nd Ed. 1929) ch. v.
1 53 C. J. 29.
17 Cates v. Allen (1892) 149 U. S. 451; McDougall v. Huntingdon & Broad
Top Mountain Railroad & Coal Co. (1928) 294 Pa. 108, 143 Atl. 574; Scott v.
Neely (1890) 140 U. S. 106.
Is Note, Right of Creditor to Appointment of Receiver for Debtor Cor-
poration (1929) 38 Yale L. J. 668.
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where the judgment at law would appear useless or unob-
tainable.9
The Missouri decisions, although authority is meager on the
point, are in accord with the general proposition that a simple
contract creditor must establish his claim at law before resorting
to receivership. Such requirement certainly seems called for
by the general statement of the law in the Merriam case (which
has never been questioned subsequently), declaring that the peti-
tioner must show either (1) a right to the property itself; (2) a
lien upon it; or (3) that it constitutes a special fund to which he
has a right to resort in satisfaction of his claim. In the case of
Miller Bros. v. Perkins20 the Supreme Court of Missouri held that
the circuit court had no power to appoint a receiver to take charge
of the defendant's property in an ordinary action at law for the
collection of a money judgment. In Guibert v. Kessinger,21 there
is a direct statement, which, however, is by way of dictum:
"... unless there is a statute extending to creditors at
large the right to have a receiver appointed, the only creditor
who can maintain such action must be either a judgment or a
lien creditor."
Statutes in a number of jurisdictions authorize a creditor to sue
for a receiver without first obtaining a judgment, at least where
the corporation is insolvent.22 Missouri, however, has no such
statute upon the point, and the Missouri law undoubtedly is as
expressed in the dictum in Guilbert v. Kessinger.
B. Admission and Consent of the Defendant as a Waiver of the
Defence
In the federal courts the doctrine has been developed that the
objection that a creditor, suing for the appointment of a receiver
for a corporation has not reduced his claim to judgment is notjurisdictional and can be waived by the appearance and admission
or consent of the defendant. 23 If the corporation consents, a re-
ceiver may be appointed at the instance of a simple contract
creditor.24 This development of consent receiverships began with
the appointment of receivers for public utilities but has been ex-
3. Lion Bonding Co. v. Karatz (C. C. A. 8th, 1922) 280 F. 532; Nunnally
v. Straus (1897) 94 Va. 255, 26 S. E. 580.
20 (1899) 154 Mo. 629, 55 S. W. 874.
21 (1913) 183 Mo. App. 680, 160 S. W. 17.
22 16 Fletcher, Cyc. Corp. (1933) p. 99, cases cited.
23 Superior Oil Corp. v. Matlock (1931) 47 F. (2d) 993 cites the cases on
this point decided by the Supreme Court of the United States.24 "That defect could only be remedied and immediate court action secured
by an answer of the company admitting the averments of the bill and con-
senting to a receivership." Harkin v. Brundage (1928) 276 U. S. 36, citing
Pusey & Jones Co. v. Hanssen (1923) 261 U. S. 491.
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tended to other cases.2 5 There is some state authority to the
same effect.2 6 Friendly suits, especially in the federal courts,
have been subjected to vigorous attack on the basis of policy.27
There can be found in the decisions of the Supreme Court of
Missouri no express approval of the federal view that defence
on the ground that the petitioner is a mere general creditor may
be waived by the appearance and admission of the defendant cor-
poration. Reference to the statistical report, however, will show
that the St. Louis Circuit Judges have not waited for the Supreme
Court of Missouri to place its stamp of approval upon "consent
receiverships"; for it is the usual practice for an unsecured
creditor to bring an action for receivership against a corporation,
which then obliges by filing immediately its admission and
consent.
The total number of suits filed by creditors and resulting in
receiverships was 135. Of these 59 were suits filed by judgment
creditors, secured creditors, bondholders, mechanic's lein holders
and others whose interest was in the second class approved in the
Merriam decisions. In the other 76 cases which ultimately re-
sulted in receiverships, the petitioner was a general unsecured
creditor. The fact that appeals from the granting of these cases
were not taken shows either that they were of a "friendly" nature
or that the damage done to the credit of the company by placing it
in receivership rendered appeal futile. The want of audible pro-
test would indicate that the first alternative is probably the cor-
rect one.
Whether the practice of "consent" receiverships should be al-
lowed to develop raises a clear question of policy. Against the
asserted advantage of permitting corporations, by this round-
about means, to effectuate reorganization is balanced a danger
that in "friendly" suits of this nature there is a great opportunity
for unjust preferences among creditors and for other fraud. To
this writer it would seem that the Receivership Committee of the
St. Louis Bar Association declared the policy which the Missouri
courts should follow when the practice of "consent" or "friendly"
receiverships finally comes up for official sanction, when it stated
in its report:
"Whatever may be the law, we think the appointment of re-
ceivers in such cases, as a matter of course, where merely
private companies are involved, is of doubtful policy."
HARRY WILLMER JONES, '34.
25 Wham, Consent Receiverships in the Federal Court (1933) 11 A. B.
A. J. 7.
Woods v. Capitol Hill State Bank (1921) 70 Col. 221; 199 Pac. 964.
27 May Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. F. & W. Grand 5-10-25 Cent Stores (D. C. D.
Mont. 1932), 59 F. (2d) 218, holding in contempt parties and their counsel
instituting collusive corporate receivership suit.
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